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Abstract
Understanding and evaluating the robustness of neural
networks under adversarial settings is a subject of growing
interest. Attacks proposed in the literature usually work with
models trained to minimize cross-entropy loss and output
softmax probabilities. In this work, we present interesting ex-
perimental results that suggest the importance of considering
other loss functions and target representations, specifically,
(1) training on mean-squared error and (2) representing tar-
gets as codewords generated from a random codebook. We
evaluate the robustness of neural networks that implement
these proposed modifications using existing attacks, showing
an increase in accuracy against untargeted attacks of up to
98.7% and a decrease of targeted attack success rates of up
to 99.8%. Our model demonstrates more robustness com-
pared to its conventional counterpart even against attacks
that are tailored to our modifications. Furthermore, we find
that the parameters of our modified model have significantly
smaller Lipschitz bounds, an important measure correlated
with a model’s sensitivity to adversarial perturbations.
1. Introduction
Neural networks produce state-of-the-art results across a
large number of domains ([16], [36], [35], [12]). Despite in-
creasing adoption of neural networks in commercial settings,
recent work has shown that such algorithms are susceptible
to inputs with imperceptible perturbations meant to cause
misclassification ([33], [10]). It is thus important to inves-
tigate additional vulnerabilities as well as defenses against
them.
In this paper we investigate the problem of adversarial
attacks on image classification systems. Attacks so far have
only considered the conventional neural network architec-
ture which outputs softmax predictions and is trained by
minimizing the cross-entropy loss function. We thus pro-
pose and evaluate the robustness of neural networks against
adversarial attacks with the following modifications:
Figure 1. Top. Adversarial images generated by the targeted
white-box Madry et al. attack using the CIFAR-10 test dataset
and a DenseNet model with one-hot target representations and
softmax outputs trained to minimize cross-entropy. Bottom. Ad-
versarial images generated under the identical setting, but using a
DenseNet model trained to minimize the mean-squared error be-
tween tanh outputs and codeword targets. We choose the smallest 
which achieve success rates of 100% against each model (0.03 and
0.35, respectively).
• Train the model to minimize mean-squared error
(MSE), rather than cross-entropy.
• Replace traditional one-hot target representations with
codewords generated from a random codebook.
We evaluate our proposed modifications from multiple an-
gles. First, we measure the robustness of the modified model
using attacks under multiple threat scenarios. Secondly, we
introduce an attack which, without sacrificing its efficacy
towards conventional architectures, is tailored to our pro-
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posed modifications. Finally, we conduct spectral analysis
on the model’s parameters to compute their upper Lipschitz
bounds, a measure that has been shown to be correlated
with a model’s robustness. Our results in Section 5 demon-
strate that, across all three evaluations, our proposed model
displays increased robustness compared to its conventional
counterpart.
2. Background
2.1. Neural networks
A neural network is a non-linear function Fθ that maps
data x ∈ Rn to targets y ∈ Rd, where n, d are the dimen-
sions of the input and target spaces, respectively, and θ repre-
sents the parameters of the neural network. For conventional
neural networks and classification tasks, y is typically a one-
hot representation of the class label and d is the number of
classes in the dataset. In this work, we use the DenseNet ar-
chitecture [13] as the existing benchmark, which has recently
produced state-of-the-art results on several image datasets.
2.2. Adversarial examples
The goal of an adversarial attack is to cause some misclas-
sification from the target neural network. In particular, [33]
has shown that it is possible to construct some x˜ by adding
minimal perturbations to the original input x such that the
model misclassifies x˜. Here, x˜ is commonly referred to as an
adversarial example, while the original data x is referred to
as a clean example. Apart from image classification, adver-
sarial attacks have been proposed in both natural language
and audio domains ([6], [2], [40]).
2.3. Attacks
Settings. We explore two adversarial settings, namely
white-box and black-box scenarios. In the white-box setting,
the attacker has access to and utilizes the model’s parameters,
outputs, target representations, and loss function to generate
adversarial examples. In the black-box scenario, the attacker
has no access to the model’s parameters or specifications
and only has the ability to query it for predictions. In this
work, we employ transfer attacks, a type of black-box at-
tack where adversarial examples are generated using a proxy
model which the adversary has access to.
Types. There are mainly two types of attacks. In a targeted
attack, an adversary generates an adversarial example so that
the target model returns some target class t. A targeted attack
is evaluated by its success rate, which is the proportion of
images for which the target class was successfully predicted
(the lower the better from the perspective of the defense). On
the other hand, in an untargeted attack, the attacker causes
the model to simply return some prediction y′ 6= y. It is
evaluated by the accuracy of the target model, which denotes
the proportion of images which failed to get misclassified
(the higher the better from the perspective of the defense).
The following sections describe the attacks used in this
work.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). The Fast Gradient
Sign Method [10], one of the earliest gradient-based attacks,
generates adversarial examples via:
x˜ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, yt))
where J is the loss function of the neural network, yt
is the target class, and  is a parameter which controls the
magnitude of the perturbations made to the original input
x. The gradient, which is taken w.r.t the input, determines
which direction each pixel should be perturbed in order to
maximize the loss function and cause a misclassification.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). The Basic Iterative
Method, proposed by [18], applies FGSM iteratively to find
more effective adversarial examples.
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM). The Momentum
Iterative Method [9] combines iterative gradient-based at-
tacks with the accumulation of a velocity vector based on
the gradient of the loss function.
L-BFGS Attack. [33] proposed the L-BFGS attack, the
first targeted white-box attack on convolutional neural net-
works, which solves the following constrained optimization
problem:
minimize c · ‖x− x˜‖22 + LF,t(x˜)
s.t. x˜ ∈ [0, 1]n
The above formulation aims to minimize two objectives;
the left term measures the distance (L2 norm) between the
input and the adversarial example, while the right term rep-
resents the cross-entropy loss. It is used only as a targeted
attack.
Deep Fool. The Deep Fool attack, proposed by [24], is
an attack which imagines the decision boundaries of neural
networks to be linear hyperplanes and uses an iterative opti-
mization algorithm similar to the Newton-Raphson method
to find the smallest L2 perturbation which causes a misclas-
sification. It is used only as an untargeted attack.
Madry et al. [22] proposed an attack based on projected
gradient descent (PGD), which relies on local first order
information of the target model. The method is similar to
FGSM and BIM, except that it uses random starting positions
for generating adversarial examples.
Carlini & Wagner L2 (CWL2) . The Carlini & Wagner
L2 attack [5] follows an optimization problem similar to that
of L-BFGS but replaces cross-entropy with a cost function
that depends on the pre-softmax logits of the network. In
particular, the attack solves the following problem:
minimize ‖δ‖2 + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where δ is the perturbation made to the input and f is the
objective function:
f(x˜) = max(max
i 6=t
(z(x˜)i − z(x˜)t), 0)
Here, z(x) represents the pre-softmax logits of the net-
work. In short, the attack aims to maximize the logit value of
the target class while minimizing the L2 norm of the input
perturbations.
3. Improving adversarial robustness
In this work we have two proposals. First, we propose
changes to the conventional neural network architecture and
target representations to defend against adversarial attacks
described in Section 2.3. Second, we propose a modified,
more effective CWL2 attack that is specifically tailored to
our proposed defense.
3.1. Training on mean-squared error
Instead of the conventional cross-entropy loss, we pro-
pose to use MSE to compute the error between the output
of the model Fθ and the target y ∈ Y , where Y is the set of
target representations for all classes. During inference, we
select the output class for which its target representation y
yields the smallest euclidean distance to yˆ.
3.2. Randomized target representations
Instead of using one-hot encoding as target representa-
tions, we represent each target class as a codeword from a
random codebook. Specifically, the n target representations
corresponding to the n classes are sampled once at the be-
ginning of training from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1)d
based on a secret key. To match the representation space of
the network output and the targets, the conventional softmax
layer is replaced with a tanh activation with d outputs.
3.3. Modified CWL2 attack
The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack makes several assump-
tions about the target network’s architecture based on its cost
function mentioned in Section 2.3, namely that the highest
logit value corresponds to the most likely class. However,
applying our proposed neural network modifications breaks
such assumptions, for the output of the network would be
tanh activations and the length of the output would not cor-
respond to the number of classes in the dataset. We thus
propose a simple modification to the CWL2 attack where
the cost function considers the distance D in some metric
space between the logits and the targets:
f(x˜) = max(D(z(x˜)t, t)−min
i 6=t
D(z(x˜)i, i), 0)
Like with the Carlini & Wagner L2 attack, f(x˜) = 0 if
and only if the model predicts the target class. Using the
change-of-variables formulation utilized in [5] to enforce
box constraints on the perturbations, our attack finds some
w which optimizes the following objective:
min
∥∥∥∥12(tanh(w) + 1)− x
∥∥∥∥2
2
+ c · f(1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)
where c is a trade-off constant that controls the impor-
tance of the size of perturbations (larger values of c allow
for larger distortions). For our experiments, we have defined
D(x, y) as the euclidean distance.
3.4. Lipschitz bounds and robustness
Earlier works have suggested that the sensitivity of neural
networks towards adversarial perturbations can be measured
with the upper Lipschitz bound of each network layer [33].
Parseval Networks [7], for example, have introduced a layer-
wise regularization technique for improving robustness by
enforcing smaller global Lipschitz bounds. More specifically,
[7] have shown that:
E[Jadv(F (x˜, θ), y, )] ≤ E[J(F (x, θ), y)] + λΛ
where Jadv = maxx˜:‖x˜−x‖≤ J(F (x˜, θ), y) , and λ,Λ
are the upper Lipschitz bounds of J and F , respectively. In
other words, the efficacy of an adversarial attack depends
on the generalization error of the target model as well as the
Lipschitz bounds of its layers. This suggests that smaller
Lipschitz bounds indicate a more robust model. For both
fully-connected and convolutional layers, this can be mea-
sured by calculating their operator norms. The operator norm∥∥θl∥∥ of the l-th fully-connected layer is simply the largest
singular value of the weight matrix. The Lipschitz constant
of the l-th layer is then:
Λl =
∥∥θl∥∥Λl−1
For convolutional kernels, we rely on the formulation in
[33], which involves applying the two-dimensional discrete
Fourier Transform to find the largest singular values.
Section 5.6 presents empirical results which demonstrate
that simply changing the loss function from cross-entropy to
mean-squared error can yield model parameters with signifi-
cantly smaller Lipschitz bounds.
4. Experimental setup
In this section we describe the evaluation datasets, evalu-
ation models and adversarial image generation process.
4.1. Datasets
CIFAR-10 [16] is a small image classification dataset
with 10 classes. It contains 60,000 thumbnail-size images of
dimensions 32x32x3, of which 10,000 images are withheld
for testing.
MNIST [21] is another image classification dataset con-
taining monochromatic thumbnails (28x28) of handwritten
digits. It is comprised of 60,000 training images and 10,000
testing images.
Fashion-MNIST [38] is a relatively new image classifi-
cation dataset containing thumbnail images of 10 different
types of clothing (shoes, shirts, etc.) which acts as a drop-in
replacement to MNIST.
4.2. Models evaluated
We use three variants of the DenseNet model to generate
adversarial examples:
• O:SOFTMAX:CE refers to a DenseNet model with
softmax activations trained on cross-entropy loss and
one-hot target representations.
• O:SOFTMAX:MSE refers to a DenseNet model with
softmax activations trained on MSE and one-hot target
representations.
• R:TANH:MSE refers to a DenseNet model with tanh
activations trained on MSE using codeword target rep-
resentations. We used a codeword length of d = 128.
We have evaluated the robustness of the R:TANH:MSE
model with different codeword lengths (64, 256, and 1024)
but found no significant discrepancies in the results.
Table 1. Parameters changed for each attack
Attack Modified Parameter
Basic Iterative Method epsilon ()
Carlini & Wagner L2 initial constant (c)
Deep Fool max iterations (m)
Fast Gradient Sign Method epsilon ()
L-BFGS Attack initial constant (c)
Madry et al. epsilon ()
Momentum Iterative Method epsilon ()
4.3. Generating adversarial examples
For each dataset mentioned in Section 4.1, we train a
model on the training set and generate adversarial examples
using the test set. For targeted attacks, we randomly sample
a target class for each image in the test set.
We evaluate each model’s (listed in Section 4.2) robust-
ness against attacks (listed in Table 1) under the white-box
setting. For the R:TANH:MSE model, the attacker has access
Table 2. Parameters held constant for each attack
Attack Parameters
Basic Iterative Method eps iter nb iter
0.05 10
Carlini & Wagner L2 binary search steps max iterations
5 1000
Deep Fool nb candidate overshoot
10 0.02
L-BFGS binary search steps max iterations
5 1000
Madry et al. eps iter nb iter
0.01 40
Momentum Iterative Method eps iter nb iter
0.06 10
to the codeword representations. We also evaluate model
robustness against transfer attacks, a type of black-box at-
tack where adversarial examples are generated using a proxy
model which the adversary has access to. Finally, we further
measure the robustness of our proposed model using the
modified CWL2 attack.
All experiments are implemented using TensorFlow [1],
a popular framework for building deep learning algorithms.
4.3.1 Attack parameters
For a given attack, we generate adversarial examples across
a range of values for a particular parameter which controls
the magnitude of the perturbations made. Table 1 lists the
parameters which are modified for each attack, whereas
Table 2 lists the parameters held constant. We use the default
values defined in Cleverhans for our constant parameters.
4.3.2 Adapting attacks to our proposed techniques
The attacks described in Section 2.3 are implemented using
the Cleverhans library [25]. By default, the attacks assume
that the model outputs softmax predictions and that the tar-
gets are represented as one-hot vectors. Hence the internal
loss function for some attacks (e.g. gradient-based iterative
attacks) is predefined as cross-entropy. However, because
the cross-entropy loss function is not compatible with the
R:TANH:MSE model, we have adapted the library to use
mean-squared error when the target model has also been
trained on mean-squared error. These adaptations are impor-
tant in preserving the white-box assumption of each attack.
5. Experimental observations
In this section, we present and analyze the performance
of the evaluation models under different attack scenarios:
Table 3. Robustness of each model against each untargeted white-box attack. The table below reports the accuracy (the higher the better)
of each model against each attack.
CWL2 (c) MIM () Deep Fool (m)
Setting 0.01 0.1 1 10 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 10 20 30 40
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.682 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.159 0.049 0.034 0.031
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.078 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.838 0.595 0.509 0.467 0.112 0.069 0.065 0.061
R:TANH:MSE 0.583 0.584 0.586 0.585 0.919 0.701 0.593 0.536 0.583 0.582 0.582 0.582
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.994 0.661 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.897 0.182 0.123 0.118 0.997 0.986 0.956 0.831 0.100 0.074 0.059 0.049
R:TANH:MSE 0.995 0.995 0.975 0.983 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.973 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.196 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.049 0.042 0.041 0.041
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.156 0.076 0.057 0.049 0.836 0.304 0.211 0.142 0.082 0.064 0.059 0.056
R:TANH:MSE 0.946 0.942 0.946 0.945 0.902 0.691 0.574 0.568 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.935
BIM () FGSM () Madry et al. ()
Setting 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.1
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.751 0.053 0.042 0.042 0.743 0.291 0.193 0.139 0.301 0.050 0.041 0.041
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.807 0.424 0.240 0.174 0.879 0.729 0.666 0.535 0.790 0.707 0.668 0.608
R:TANH:MSE 0.850 0.634 0.390 0.213 0.923 0.699 0.604 0.451 0.923 0.897 0.877 0.839
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.994 0.628 0.015 0.008 0.994 0.949 0.654 0.227 0.983 0.809 0.263 0.008
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.997 0.929 0.490 0.196 0.997 0.988 0.985 0.774 0.992 0.983 0.975 0.896
R:TANH:MSE 0.995 0.882 0.429 0.196 0.995 0.995 0.918 0.332 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.993
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.564 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.659 0.321 0.225 0.147 0.046 0.036 0.033 0.029
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.815 0.296 0.176 0.142 0.882 0.509 0.362 0.224 0.731 0.542 0.425 0.315
R:TANH:MSE 0.799 0.233 0.089 0.051 0.905 0.671 0.389 0.185 0.901 0.863 0.829 0.802
untargeted and targeted attacks (Section 5.2), black-box at-
tacks (Section 5.3), and our modified CWL2 attack (Section
5.4). Benchmark performances on the original datasets are
presented in Section 5.1.
5.1. Clean test performance
Table 4 lists the accuracy of each model across each clean
test dataset. We observe minimal differences in accuracies
across the models, and hence our proposed modifications
can maintain state-of-the-art classification performances.
5.2. Untargeted and targeted attacks
Table 3 lists the accuracies of the models against un-
targeted white-box attacks. Both O:SOFTMAX:MSE and
R:TANH:MSE models demonstrate higher accuracies on the
adversarial examples compared to the O:SOFTMAX:CE
Table 4. Accuracy on each clean test dataset.
CIFAR-10 MNIST F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 0.933 0.996 0.948
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.931 0.997 0.948
R:TANH:MSE 0.930 0.996 0.945
model; we observe an increase in accuracies of up to
98.7%. Similar results can be observed in Table 5, where the
O:SOFTMAX:MSE and R:TANH:MSE models achieve a
consistent decrease in attack success rates of up to 99.8%.
5.3. Black box attacks
Table 6 shows the accuracies of transfer attacks against
the O:SOFTMAX:MSE and R:TANH:MSE models. Our pro-
posed models demonstrate more robustness towards black-
Table 5. Robustness of each model against each targeted white-box attack. The table below reports the success rates (the lower the better)
of each attack.
L-BFGS (c) BIM () Madry et al. ()
Setting 0.01 0.1 1 10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.997 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.934 0.998 1.00 1.00
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.667 0.864 0.955 0.994 0.461 0.624 0.658 0.664 0.266 0.343 0.402 0.441
R:TANH:MSE 0.272 0.475 0.554 0.564 0.230 0.337 0.353 0.353 0.242 0.345 0.426 0.467
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.851 0.992 0.997 0.999 0.057 0.464 0.828 0.94
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.040 0.536 0.92 0.991 0.316 0.539 0.597 0.612 0.008 0.042 0.163 0.269
R:TANH:MSE 0.045 0.457 0.72 0.776 0.057 0.129 0.169 0.184 0.007 0.068 0.154 0.245
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.957 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.999 1.00 1.00 1.00
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.571 0.87 0.97 0.992 0.457 0.581 0.600 0.603 0.464 0.589 0.648 0.659
R:TANH:MSE 0.644 0.808 0.826 0.832 0.807 0.926 0.938 0.940 0.626 0.724 0.794 0.834
CWL2 (c) MIM () FGSM ()
Setting 0.01 0.1 1 10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.445 0.316 0.231 0.182
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.756 0.842 0.861 0.867 0.351 0.433 0.459 0.468 0.046 0.061 0.071 0.083
R:TANH:MSE 0.368 0.362 0.361 0.346 0.095 0.136 0.137 0.160 0.028 0.044 0.081 0.082
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.908 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.095 0.131 0.115 0.113
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.176 0.592 0.677 0.669 0.153 0.319 0.347 0.357 0.014 0.028 0.052 0.067
R:TANH:MSE 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.023 0.040 0.052 0.050 0.007 0.031 0.047 0.067
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.213 0.158 0.122 0.109
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.658 0.812 0.845 0.851 0.394 0.396 0.394 0.382 0.073 0.085 0.102 0.107
R:TANH:MSE 0.583 0.592 0.576 0.548 0.114 0.140 0.143 0.147 0.048 0.081 0.088 0.097
box attacks compared to the white-box versions with the
same configurations. Though this is expected behavior, it
is imperative to evaluate a defense under multiple threat
scenarios.
5.4. Modified CWL2 attack
Table 7 compares our proposed attack with the CWL2
attack. The results show that our attack maintains its effi-
cacy against O:SOFTMAX:CE models while significantly
increasing its success rate against the R:TANH:MSE model
up to 70.9%. We note that increasing the initial constant for
our attack yields increased success rates, which is aligned
with the intuition that the parameter controls the importance
of the attack’s success as highlighted in Section 3.3. We also
observe that, despite the increase in the attack’s efficacy, the
R:TANH:MSE model displays more robustness compared
to the O:SOFTMAX:CE model, with a decrease in success
rates of up to 28.5%.
5.5. Distortion vs. performance
On page 1, Figure 1 displays adversarial images gener-
ated from targeted white-box Madry et al. attacks on the
O:SOFTMAX:CE and R:TANH:MSE models respectively.
We choose the lowest  for which the attack achieves success
rates of 100%. It is clear that the R:TANH:MSE model re-
quires much larger perturbations for an attack to achieve the
same success rates as against the O:SOFTMAX:CE model.
Figure 2 displays adversarial images generated using the
Momentum Iterative Method against both O:SOFTMAX:CE
and R:TANH:MSE models where  = 0.1. We observe that
the R:TANH:MSE model is robust even against adversarial
images where the perturbations are clearly perceptible to
Table 6. Accuracy on adversarial data generated under the black-
box setting. All adversarial examples are generated using the
O:SOFTMAX:CE model. Both the O:SOFTMAX:MSE and
R:TANH:MSE models show higher accuracy towards black-box
attacks compared to untargeted white-box attacks.
Setting CWL2 Deep Fool MIM
Parameter c = 0.01 m = 10  = 0.01
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.483 0.451 0.895
R:TANH:MSE 0.612 0.617 0.926
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.996 0.984 0.997
R:TANH:MSE 0.996 0.973 0.995
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:MSE 0.937 0.933 0.839
R:TANH:MSE 0.952 0.946 0.935
Table 7. Success rates of the targeted Carlini & Wagner L2
attack and our tailored attack on the O:SOFTMAX:CE and
R:TANH:MSE models.
CWL2 (c) Ours (c)
Setting 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0
CIFAR-10
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R:TANH:MSE 0.368 0.362 0.859 0.868
MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R:TANH:MSE 0.006 0.006 0.715 0.772
F-MNIST
O:SOFTMAX:CE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R:TANH:MSE 0.583 0.592 0.798 0.829
humans.
Finally, we visualize adversarial examples generated us-
ing our modified CWL2 attack and the R:TANH:MSE model
in Figure 3, where the attack achieves higher success rates
compared to the original attack. The perturbations made
to the images are much less perceptible compared to the
adversarial examples displayed in Figures 1 and 2.
5.6. Comparing upper Lipschitz bounds
Figure 4 compares the upper Lipschitz bounds of
convolutional layers between the O:SOFTMAX:CE and
O:SOFTMAX:MSE models. The upper bounds for the
O:SOFTMAX:MSE model are consistently smaller than
those of the O:SOFTMAX:CE model across each dataset up
to a factor of three, supporting our hypothesis that models
trained to minimize mean-squared error are more robust to
small perturbations.
Figure 2. Top. Adversarial images generated for MNIST using the
targeted MIM attack ( = 0.1) on the O:SOFTMAX:CE model.
The attack achieves a success rate of 90.8%. Bottom. Adversarial
images generated under the identical setting for the R:TANH:MSE
model. The attack achieves a success rate of 2.3%.
Figure 3. Adversarial examples generated by our proposed attack
(c = 0.1) on the R:TANH:MSE model for test images from the
CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
Figure 4. Upper Lipschitz bounds of convolutional layers of
the O:SOFTMAX:CE and O:SOFTMAX:MSE models for each
dataset.
6. Related work
Several defenses have also been proposed. To date, the
most effective defense technique is adversarial training ([19],
[37], [31], [34]), where the model is trained on a mix of
clean and adversarial data. This has shown to provide a
regularization effect that makes models more robust towards
attacks.
[27] proposed defensive distillation, a mechanism
whereby a model is trained based on soft labels generated
by another ‘teacher’ network in order to prevent overfitting.
Other methods include introducing randomness to or apply-
ing transformations on the input data and/or the layers of
the network ([11], [8], [28], [39]). However, [3] have identi-
fied that the apparent robustness of several defenses can be
attributed to the introduction of computation and transforma-
tions that mask the gradients and thus break existing attacks
that rely on gradients to generate adversarial examples. Their
work demonstrates that small, tailored modifications to the
attacks can circumvent these defenses completely.
7. Conclusion
We have reported interesting experimental results demon-
strating the adversarial robustness of models that do not
follow conventional specifications. We have observed that
simply changing the loss function that is minimized during
training can greatly impact the robustness of a neural net-
work against adversarial attacks. Our evaluation strategy
is manifold, consisting of existing attacks, new attacks ad-
justed to our proposed modifications, and a spectral analysis
of the model’s parameters. The increase in robustness ob-
served from experimental results suggests the importance
of considering alternatives to conventional design choices
when making neural networks more secure. Future work
would involve further investigation into the reasons for such
modifications to improve the robustness of neural networks.
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